Rentier Developmentalism, Servicization and DInRT Economies by constantine, collin
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Rentier Developmentalism, Servicization
and DInRT Economies
collin constantine
2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/60331/
MPRA Paper No. 60331, posted 4. January 2015 05:07 UTC
Rentier Developmentalism, Servicization and 
DInRT Economies 
 
Collin Constantine 
University of London: SOAS 
2014 constantinecollin@gmail.com	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Abstract 
This article draws a parallel between rentier capitalism and what the author calls rentier 
developmentalism. This refers to the growing influence of rent seeking or DInRT sectors: 
Distribution, ICTn (that are non-tradable), Restaurant and Transportation & storage. 
Similar to rentier capitalism and financialization, the growth of DInRT economies is part 
of a serivicizaton process that result in economic fragility and increasing inequality. 
Therefore, further classification of countries into FIRE and DInRT economies are needed 
to ascertain the quality and inclusive nature of growth in the poor and developing world. 
The article highlights the importance of re-incorporating the concept of Ricardian rents 
and differentiating these from profits in economic analysis. 
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1  Introduction 
This article draws a parallel between rentier capitalism and rentier 
developmentalism (a concept coined by the author), and investigates the foundations of 
these economies: FIRE and DInRT industries. FIRE economies are dominated by 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate sectors, while Distribution, ICTn (that are non-
tradable), Restaurant and Transportation & storage industries are the major areas in 
DInRT economies. The increasing influence of FIRE and DInRT industries characterize 
the processes of financialization and servicization respectively. The latter gives rise to 
rentier devleopmentalism as much as the financialization process manufactures rentier 
capitalism.  
The literature (Haldane 2010a, Kay 2012, Turner 2012 and Stiglitz 2013) 
emphasizes the adverse implications of rent seeking and its role in the recent financial 
crisis. But this analysis has been confined to the rich and emerging countries with 
dynamic financial markets. This article is well positioned to make a parallel argument for 
other poor and developing countries where DInRT instead of FIRE industries dominate. 
Notwithstanding this difference, the article contends that rentier economies engender 
similar patterns of inequality, consumption, debt and democratic capture. 
 With the aid of national income identities that incorporate rents, this article 
highlights the nexus between rentier economies and inequality. The author advances the 
argument that the rent seeking literature does not adequately differentiate between 
Ricardian rents and profits, which explains why GDP indicators over estimate value 
creation (Mazzucato and Shipman 2014) and (Shaikh and Tonak 1996). Therefore, three 
measures are introduced to account for the scale of the rentier economy. 
 The article uses Guyana (a small open economy) as a case study to investigate the 
characteristics of DInRT economies. Consistent with rentier economies, the case study 
reveals rising inequality and conspicuous consumption in Guyana. The major players in 
Guyana’s services industry are DInRT sectors and these are projected to be the leading 
growth areas: indicative of the deepening of servicization. 
  Accordingly, the article advocates for further classification of countries besides 
high, middle and low-income groups. Categorizing countries as FIRE or DInRT 
economies reveals the sustainability and inclusive nature of their growth models. 
Additionally, the author proposes a new definition of a developing country: a nation that 
increases its standard of living (along with political and social freedoms) with a low rent-
income ratio. This ensures that the growth process is anchored by real investments as 
opposed to financialization or servicization. The argument that servicization drives 
rentier developmentalism strengthens the defense of industrial policies and innovation 
systems, as structural transformation reduces the influence of the DInRT sectors.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the concept 
of value and explains the difference between rents and profits. Section 3 introduces the 
concepts of rentier developmentalism, servicization and DInRT and constructs an 
accounting framework for rents. Section 4 compares and contrast rentier capitalism and 
developmentalism, while section 5 discusses the nexus between rentier economies and 
inequality. Section 6 investigates the Guyana case study and section 7 briefly examines 
the implications of the new concepts and metrics for the development literature. Section 8 
concludes.  
2 Value, Rents, and Profits  
 In classical political economy (Smith 1993) and (Ricardo 1951) distinctions were 
made between productive vs. unproductive labour; value creation vs. value extraction and 
rents vs. profits. These distinctions enhanced the ability to determine the differences 
among value creation, distribution and utilization. This leads us to the following 
classification advanced by (Shaikh and Tonak 1996). 
2.1 Spheres of Social Reproduction: A Classical Perspective 
• Production: The creation of value - undertaken by production labour. 
• Distribution/Exchange: The allocation of value through market/non-market means, 
or the transfer of titles of ownership from one individual/group to another. Since 
this is the allocation of value it is undertaken by non-production labour.   
• Social Maintenance: Public and private services that maintain social order: e.g. 
public administration and security services etc. The source of financing for social 
maintenance is the production sector (e.g. tax receipts from production activities); 
thus, social maintenance is the utilization of value and is undertaken by non-
production labour.  
• Personal consumption: The utilization of value by individuals.  
Equations (1) and (2) formalize this classical taxonomy:  
 D +  Sm =  Sc  (1) 
 Sc +  Pc =  Tc  (2) 
 Where D,  Sm,  Sc,  Pc  and  Tc  are distribution, social maintenance, social 
consumption, private consumption and total consumption respectively. Any stimulus to 
social consumption is equivalent to an increase in effective demand, even though it is an 
extraction of value. But boosting social consumption to pursue Keynesian demand 
management is a short-term fix and not a sustainable source of long run growth. Even if 
we invoke Kaldor-Verdoorn law (Kaldor 1978) there are inevitable limits to consumption 
led growth.  
 But what do we mean by value or value creation? This refers to the net increase in 
real output or the outcome of production activities. Some services (software 
development) can be considered production activities when they enhance the useful 
properties of a commodity. In short, value is created in production and not realization 
(Marx 1992). This view of value creation is at odds with (Mazzucato and Shipman 2014), 
they argue that value creation is a production or distribution activity generating outputs 
that can be sold for more than their production costs. As the sphere of social reproduction 
explains, distribution activities simply allocate already created value, therefore, 
(Mazzucato and Shipman 2014) associates the distribution of value with value creation. 
Notwithstanding this stark contrast, both (Mazzucato and Shipman 2014) and (Shaikh 
and Tonak 1996) contend that national income statistics grossly overestimate the creation 
of value.  
 Modern national income accounting considers social consumption as production 
activities (a stark contrast to the classical perspective) since they produce social goods 
that people are willing to pay for. Consequently, national income metrics record incomes 
that do not arise from value added activities (Mazzucato and Shipman 2014). A good 
example of this would be incomes earned in the social consumption sectors. But the 
classical economists do not deny the important role social consumption plays in the cycle 
of social reproduction, on the contrary, their contention is that an economy cannot sustain 
itself based on value extraction.  
2.2 Ricardian Rent 
 (Ricardo 1951) defined rent as the income earned by landowners but not on account 
of their productive powers, however, due to the differences in the fertility of their land. 
The owner of the land that is relatively more fertile earns rent. Ricardo despises this 
source of income since the landowner has done little to generate this income; the latter is 
purely because of his deeds of ownership. Thus, Ricardian rents are not associated with 
production activities or entrepreneurial talent; ergo, Ricardian rents are not related to 
value creation. The rent seeking literature advanced by (Tullock 1967) and (Krueger 
1974) emerged from this conception of rent.  
 As (Krueger 1974) insists, rent seeking is the tendency to spend money on political 
lobbying purely for the purposes of increasing one’s wealth without creating new wealth. 
Essentially, rents and the rent seeking process are a form of value extraction. This 
describes much of the financial industries in the OECD countries (Haldane 2010a, Kay 
2012, Turner 2012 and Stiglitz 2013) and is an important driver of inequality (Stiglitz 
2013). It is important to note that (Mazzucato and Shipman 2014) defines value 
extraction as income generated from previous productive or speculative capital gain. 
Though this definition captures an essential component of value extraction (rent seeking), 
it includes income generated through value creation, which hinders an understanding of 
Ricardian rents.  
 The rent seeking literature (Tullock 1967) and (Krueger 1974) is also guilty of this, 
since it does not go far enough in explaining the crucial difference between profits and 
rents. The fact that we include distribution services and government current outlays as 
value added in GDP emphasizes this point. Somehow, the rent seeking literature is only 
popularly associated with political corruption, monopolies, and poor transparency. But 
Ricardian rents are also present in transparent and legal speculative transactions or even 
in respectable occupations in the public service as section 2.1 highlights. The narrow 
conception of rent seeking means that a wide array of activities could be considered as 
productive investments; this is why financial innovation (credit default swaps, derivatives 
etc.) and even speculation were considered as value creating activities. This article 
defines rent as income earned without a corresponding increase in real output. 
2.3 Profits 
 Since rents are associated with non-production activities, it follows that profits are 
the rewards for value creation. While rent seekers earn rents, entrepreneurs earn profits: 
those businessmen and women who undertake real investments.    
2.4 A Smithian Contribution 
 (Smith 1993) drew a clear dichotomy between productive and unproductive labour 
to illustrate that some employment creates value while others consume value. 
Notwithstanding the essential roles of the sovereign and domestic servants, (Smith 1993) 
explains that these are unproductive labour. Incorporating Smith’s terms into our analysis 
reveals that employment in the social consumption sector is composed of unproductive 
labour and contributes to value extraction. A synthesis of the classical ideas shows that 
profits and value creation are likened to productive labour, while rents and value 
extraction are equated to unproductive labour. Yet, (Smith 1993)  was clear that the latter 
is essential to the process of social reproduction; after all, the point of value creation is 
the utilization of its use values.  
2.5 From the Classics to the Great Recession  
 The dominance of rent seeking in the American political system is cited as one of 
the contributory factors to the great recession (Stiglitz 2013), since this led to the 
deregulation of financial markets, stagnant minimum wages and the de-unionization of 
American workers. These outcomes intensified rent seeking and led to the inventions of 
financial instruments that served the interests of speculators as opposed to entrepreneurs. 
Trading these financial assets involves the transfer of ownership of pieces of paper; 
income derived from these sources cannot be considered profits from the classical 
perspective. On the contrary, these are rents - Ricardian landlord rents. 
 Mainstream economists have informed us that no one could have seen the crisis 
coming (Bernanke 2007) and that it would be more efficient to clean up the aftermath of 
a crisis than to prevent it. But when one consults the classical economists it becomes 
obvious that a society is headed for a crisis when its dominant source of income is rents. 
In short, a rent-ridden society is a crisis prone society. Since our modern day national 
income metrics do not explicitly measure rents, our ability to predict financial crises is 
compromised. In fact, what our national income accountants consider productive 
investments are usually some form of value extraction or consumption. For instance: the 
financial sector is integral to any growth process, but its purpose is to channel scare 
financial resources to the most profitable value creating investments. When financial 
sectors abstain from this function and their preoccupation becomes trading pieces of 
paper, rent seeking plagues financial markets. But these are considered as productive 
investments aimed at financial deepening.  
 In the previous decades leading up to the great recession, financial innovation 
(without a corresponding increase in real investment) was seen as a virtue and essential to 
the growth process. Today we know better, the decades prior to the great recession was a 
period of value extraction artificially supported by a housing bubble.   
3 Rentier Capitalism, Financialization and FIRE  
 While there is no consensus on the definition of financialization, (Epstein 2001) 
defines it as follows: the importance of financial markets, financial motives, financial 
institutions and financial elites in the operation of the economy and its governing 
institutions, both at the national and international level. Generally, when the dominant 
class and source of income are rentiers and rents respectively, the society is governed by 
rentier capitalism and dominated by FIRE (Finance, Insurance and Real Estate) sectors.   
3.1 Rentier Developmentalism, Servicization and DInRT  
 Countries that are trapped in a transition stage to capitalism or advanced capitalism 
by ‘entrepreneurs’ who undertake fictitious investments can be considered imprisoned by 
a rentier developmental model. These fictitious investments are rent seeking activities 
masquerading as entrepreneurship. 
 Fictitious investments boost DInRT (Distribution, ICTn (that are non-tradable), 
Restaurants and Transport and storage) sectors and appropriate value through greater 
social consumption. The growing influence of DInRT sectors in poor and developing 
countries can be called Servicization; a parallel to financialization but within the context 
of rentier developmentalism. Unlike FIRE economies, DInRT economies will not produce 
bubbles, but they are both characterized by fragile growth and rising inequality.  
3.2 Accounting for Rents 
Equation (3) depicts the well known national income identities where VA , W + P , Y , 
GDP , and C + I +G + (X −M )  are value added, wages and profits, income, gross 
domestic product and consumption, investment, government outlay and net exports 
respectively. The implicit assumption that rents are zero in this accounting framework 
makes equation (3) true and explains why GDP  is understood as a measure of total value 
added in an economy over a given period of time.  
 VA =  W + P( )  =  Y  =  GDP =  C  +  I  +  G  +  X −M( )  (3) 
But this implicit (no rent) assumption is a fatal one that corrupts our conventional 
metrics and inevitably misguides policy. Section 2.1 explains why rent-seeking activities 
are important to the process of social reproduction, which underscores the point that rents 
are embedded in society. Equation (4) modifies the standard income accounting identities 
to capture these rents ( R ):  
 W + P( )  +  R =  Y  =  GDP =  C  +  I  +  G  +  X −M( )  (4) 
 VA =  W + P( )  ≠  GDP  (5) 
 Since equation (4) is the general case value added is no longer equated with GDP  
as equation (5) illustrates. This inequality is consistent with (Mazzucato and Shipman 
2014) and (Shaikh and Tonak 1996) contention that GDP  overestimates value creation. 
When the value added to GDP  ratio is less than the rent to GDP  ratio, rentierism is 
pervasive. The same is true when the value creating employment VE( )  to total 
employment TE( )  ratio is less than the rent seeking employment RE( )  to total 
employment ratio. Rent seeking employment refers to the occupations within the social 
maintenance and distribution spheres of social reproduction highlighted in section 2.1. 
Equations (6) and (7) illustrate the necessary conditions for rentierism: 
 VA /GDP =  W + P( ) /GDP <  R /GDP =  1  (6) 
 VE /TE  <  RE /TE  =  1 (7) 
 Although equations (6) and (7) are useful for gauging the degree of rentierism in a 
society, they give no indication of the principal regulating factors of rent seeking. 
Equations (8) and (9) capture the financialization and servicization process that drive 
rentier capitalism and developmentalism respectively, where VcS  represents value 
creating sectors. As FIRE sectors exceed value-creating sectors as a ratio to GDP , the 
financialization process takes hold and equations (6) and (7) hold true. The same is true 
for rentier developmentalism (via the servicization process) as equation (9) describes.  
 FIRE /GDP >  VsS /GDP =  1  (8) 
 DInRT /GDP >  VsS /GDP =  1  (9) 
4 Rentier Capitalism vs Rentier Developmentalism  
 Table 1 illustrates the various characteristics of financialization and servicization; it 
is evident that these concepts have more in common than differences. While rentier 
capitalism is easily identified by the plethora of financial instruments (Philips 2002), 
rentier developmentalism can be recognized by the superabundance of distribution outlets 
and other consumption services. It is interesting that rising inequality is distinctive in 
both FIRE and DInRT economies, (see Constantine 2014)) for the nexus between services 
and inequality, also, consult (Stiglitz 2012) and (Piketty 2014) for rising inequality in the 
USA and the global economy respectively). 
 Another fascinating feature of rentier economies is their high consumption levels. 
This should not be surprising, by definition, rentiers are value extractors and 
consumptionists. But high consumption is not a vice in itself; it only becomes detrimental 
when nations try to consume their way to growth. More importantly, what is the 
distribution of consumption among the various classes in these rentier and high 
consumption economies? Is the consumption pattern poverty reducing or more of a 
conspicuous nature? 
 (Stockhammer 2006), (Froud et al 2002), (Williams 2000) and (Lazonick and O’ 
Sullivan 2000) argue that the main thrust of financialization is the preoccupation with 
shareholder value. This obsession encourages shares buyback at the cost of reducing long 
run real investments, which increases rents at the expense of profits. But in poor and 
developing countries, family owned enterprises are the primary form of business 
organization. Notwithstanding this, rentiers in DInRT economies are quasi-shareholders 
in the DInRT sectors: they do not control the DInRT sectors per se but they own the rents 
earned in these industries. Their preoccupation with maximizing rents in DInRT sectors 
parallels the obsession with shareholder value in rentier capitalist states and the 
cumulative effect is the same, increases in rents at the expense of profits and value 
creation. 
Table 1 Characteristics of Financialization and Servicization 
Financialization Servicization 
Fragile growth Fragile growth 
Rents at the expense of profits Rents at the expense of profits 
Increasing inequality Increasing inequality 
Low savings and high consumption Low savings and high consumption 
Obsession with shareholder value 
Obsession with quasi-shareholder 
value 
Proliferation of financial instruments 
An abundance of Distribution outlets 
and non-tradable services 
  Source: Author’s representation 
  The establishment of a rentier class is not listed in Table 1, but it is implied that 
rentier economies can be analyzed along the following class distinctions: workers, 
entrepreneurs and rentiers. Studies such as: (Duménil and Lévy  2002), (Epstein and 
Jayadev 2005) and (Greider 1997) argue that there is a re-emergence of the rentier class.  
 Notwithstanding these striking similarities, there are important differences between 
FIRE and DInRT economies. Though financialization ultimately leads to debt, bubbles 
and crises, the process requires financial experts hired to manage global investment 
portfolios and make financial predictions. These analysts earn premium wage and also 
carry home huge bonuses that are tied to the size of their portfolios, number of clienteles 
etc. Essentially, highly skilled labour is integral to the success of firms and the 
financialization process generally.  
 In DInRT economies however, there is no corresponding premium wage 
employment portfolio, there are no tradable services, no global portfolio to manage; this 
makes highly skilled labour a non-essential component of the growth process in DInRT 
economies. The human capital required for transportation & storage and distribution 
services etc., are not financial engineers trained in asset pricing. On the contrary, high 
school graduates will suffice.  
 An important difference is the nexus between industries and universities/research. 
The growth of financialization could not have been possible without academic research 
justifying the growth of financial instruments. The best graduating students are quickly 
recruited to the front lines of global enterprises and current students have opportunities to 
intern at multi-national corporations. This strong connection between industry and 
universities is absent in DInRT economies. Instead of top students being hunted by 
industry leaders, they have to tolerate periods of unemployment before becoming 
underemployed. Consequently, talent from DInRT economies migrates to FIRE 
economies; although, there are other push and pull factors that contribute to the migration 
process. See Figure 1 for a model of rentier developmentalism.  
Figure 1 Rentier Developmentalism 
Source: Author’s representation 
4.1 Why Financialization and Servicization?  
 Table 2 highlights the various explanations for financialization and servicization. 
(Stiglitz 2010) contends that the repeal of the Glass-Stegall Act blurred the lines between 
investment and commercial banking, enabling the latter to move from profit making 
ventures to the seductive rent seeking investments.  The efficient market hypothesis 
advanced by (Fama 1970) argues that no one can beat the market. This thesis was used to 
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defend the view that financial markets need little regulation since it would rein in its own 
excesses. The liberalization of capital accounts extended financialization across 
international boarders, with the consequence of distributing toxic financial assets across 
the globe. This is the essence of financial contagion.   
 (Minsky 1975) proposed the idea of the paradox of tranquillity, which argues that 
stability could be destabilizing. Persistent growth encouraged rentiers to acquire greater 
and riskier investments that ultimately accelerated the financialization process. The ease 
at which financial investments can be made over value creating investments is also a 
major growth determinant of FIRE sectors. Finally, (Palley 2007) advances the thesis that 
neo-liberalism broadly conceived and corporate globalization particularly, is responsible 
for the rise of financialization.  
 
Table 2 Sources of Financialization and Servicization 
Financialization Servicization 
It is relatively easier to make financial 
investments than real investments 
DInRT sectors are the least risky 
investment 
Efficient Market Hypothesis 
Remittance Inflow & 
Money Laundering 
Financial deregulation &  
Liberalization of capital accounts 
Complimentary infrastructure 
requirements for DInRT sectors are 
relatively less demanding  
Paradox of tranquillity Growth in Mining and Quarrying 
Repeal of Glass-Stegall Act 
Growth in government outlay in health, 
education and other social sectors 
Neo-liberalism Neo-liberalism 
  Source: Author’s representation 
 
 Trade liberalization is an essential component of neo-liberalism and the dominant 
reason for the abandonment of import substitution industrialization policies (ISI) in poor 
and developing countries. Cheaper imports and de-industrialization in the post trade 
liberalization period ignited the growth of the servicization process. This reasoning 
extends the contention of (Palley 2007) and advances the thesis that neo-liberalism is the 
principal determinant of both financialization and servicization.  
 Many Latin American & Caribbean countries are recipients of substantial 
remittance inflow. This informal institution is usually a compensatory mechanism for 
poor incomes and is most likely expended on consumption services (or DInRT sectors). 
Accordingly, remittance inflow drives the servicization process.       
 (Constantine 2014) contends that growth in the mining and quarrying sector 
regulates growth in the services industry. But government spending on critical social 
services also regulates the servicization process in DInRT economies.  The infrastructure 
requirements for DInRT sectors are relatively less demanding, which explains the 
growing influence of the services industry and rentierism. For instance, it is easier to 
establish a restaurant than to undertake an Agro-Processing venture. Therefore, 
investment in the services sector is the least risky and most popular investment activity in 
DInRT economies. Also, many opinion shapers in Guyana advance the thesis that money 
laundering is a crucial factor for the growing services industry.  
5 Inequality: FIRE and DInRT 
 The dominance of FIRE sectors in rich countries has been the principal driver of 
inequality (Stockhammer 2013), contrary to the popular thesis of technological change. 
(Stockhammer 2013) estimates the key driver of global inequality with a data set 
covering 71 countries, including 28 advanced countries and 43 emerging and developing 
nations. After controlling for globalization, technological changes and the retrenchment 
of the welfare state, (Stockhammer 2013) concludes that financialization is the chief 
determinant of inequality. Similarly, (Constantine 2014) finds that sustained growth in 
DInRT sectors increases inequality because of their low-wage-low- employment nature. 
These findings illustrate the nexus between rising inequality and rent seeking, but this 
should not be surprising as rent-income ratios exceed value added when equations (8) and 
(9) are true.  
 As financial and real investments become close substitutes (Krippner 2005), the 
bargaining power of labour deteriorates, which serves as a contributory factor to 
declining wage shares. This ease of substitution functions as a disciplinary institution for 
labour since financial investments are less likely to reduce unemployment. However, 
servicization is not a mechanism to discipline labour, as wage rates are relatively lower in 
low-income countries. It is simply a scramble to earn rents from the least risky spaces.  
 Inheritance and property taxes are usually low or non-existent in rentier economies, 
which make accumulated wealth from past generations easily transferrable. (Piketty 
2014) explains how this wealth transfer can worsen inequality and promote patrimonial 
capitalism. Inevitably, inequality of income leads to the inequality of accumulated wealth 
and defies the principle of equal opportunity. Wealth that is passed on to future 
generations enhances access to credit and social capital for the recipients, creating unfair 
competition in the market place. Thus, in rentier economies, the incomes of future 
generations are more dependent on the wealth of their parents than on their own creative 
energies. The fact that the inequality of income leads to the inequality of opportunity 
pokes a hole in the argument that reductions in poverty are more important than 
reductions of inequality. Since less than equal opportunities in the market place can erode 
the gains made in poverty reduction.  
 In plural societies, one ethnic, religious or linguistic group can occupy the entire 
rentier class and exacerbate distributional conflicts. This concentration of wealth 
adversely affects the performance of democracies in these countries. Democratic capture 
is an additional channel through which financialization and servicization increase 
inequality. Fundamentally, neither financialization nor servicization is good for 
democracy. This is an important insight since democratic institutions supposedly improve 
the distribution of income in favour of the least well off (Acemoglu 2000).  
6 A Guyana Case Study 
 Guyana is a small open economy with a services industry that accounts for 50% of 
its GDP. What is interesting is that the growth sectors within the services industry are 
DInRT sectors. Mining and quarrying, particularly gold mining regulates much of 
Guyana’s economic performance. In recent years, Guyana’s economic growth has been 
stellar, mirroring the increases in gold prices (Constantine 2014). The dominance of 
DInRT sectors makes Guyana a prime candidate for the study of rentier 
developmentalism. 
 Figure 2 illustrates the various sectors in Guyana as a percentage of GDP for the 
period 1990-2008. The first observation is that the greatest share in income is attributed 
to the services sector, but this in itself is not a problem. However, when these services are 
led by FIRE and DInRT sub-sectors we are faced with the danger of financialization and 
servicization respectively. Unlike the services industry in India, none of the sub-sectors in 
the services industry in Guyana are tradable or foreign exchange earners, with the 
exception of the underdeveloped tourism industry.   
Figure 2 Sectors as a % of GDP 
Data source: Bank of Guyana 
 There is a notable change in the trend of the services sector since 2004, as the gap 
between the services industry and the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery sectors begins to 
widen. Interestingly, real estate mortgages more than doubled in 2004 and a housing 
boom has since followed. In spite of this, the mining, construction and manufacturing 
sectors have only changed marginally as a ratio of GDP for the entire time period. Thus, 
the greater gains in national income are appropriated by the DInRT sectors; this makes 
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Guyana a rentier society and calls into question the sustainability and inclusive nature of 
its recent growth boom. (Constantine 2014) explains that inequality has increased in 
tandem with Guyana’s recently improved economic performance, ergo, the recent gains 
in income have not been widely shared.   
 Figure 2 includes a polynomial trend line for the services industry that indicates a 
ten-year forecast. If Guyana’s recent growth performance continues on its trend, the 
services industry is projected to appropriate approximately 88% of GDP in the next ten 
years (ceteris paribus). Although this projection is tentative and subject to changes in 
gold prices, remittance inflow, money laundering, government policy etc., it is instructive 
as it illustrates the magnitude of rentierism that DInRT sectors can produce. Even if future 
growth breaks away from its current trend, the present scale of rentierism will remain, 
only its rate of growth will be suspended.  
 Figure 3 illustrates the six largest industries as a percentage of GDP along with a 
ten-year growth projection of the fastest growing sectors, the data covers a time period of 
1990-2008. Two of the three largest industries that have an upward growth trend are from 
DInRT sectors, while the remaining sectors experience declining shares in GDP. These 
declining sectors (sugar cane, other manufacturing and government) have the potential to 
create value and employment, but their trend underscores the intensification of rent 
seeking in Guyana. Transport and communication and distribution services have the 
largest projected growth, (ceteris paribus); this is the epitome of servicization. Due to the 
volatile nature of Guyana’s economic performance and its high dependence on 
commodity prices, these predictions are tentative to say the least. But they indicate the 
nature and quality of growth when ever Guyana benefits from favourable commodity 
prices.  
 Consider Figure 4 below. It depicts the growth trend of final consumption 
expenditure (FCE) as a percentage of GDP for the period 1974-2012. Note carefully that 
(FCE) since 2004 is above the trend line and exceeds 100% of GDP: a mirrored image of 
America’s consumerism. This begs the following question: is the surge in consumption 
indicative of higher rentier consumption or poverty reducing consumption? Since 2007, 
profit rates have been rising relative to wage rates at the same time (FCE) increases 
(Constantine 2014): this is indicative of conspicuous consumption. However, these profits 
can be considered as rents since the growing industries are DInRT sectors.  
 (Veblen 2009) coined the concept conspicuous consumption, which argues that the 
rich consume luxury goods/services to publicly display economic power and accumulated 
wealth to gain social status. A casual observation would indicate various forms and levels 
of conspicuous consumption in Guyana. But this is not the full story; increased household 
indebtedness through real estate mortgages also contributes to rising consumption. This is 
a cause for concern as inequality and household indebtedness increase simultaneously, a 
striking parallel to the decades leading up to the financial crisis in the USA.   
 Although there are many differences between Guyana and the USA, their rentier 
economies generate similar patterns in consumption, inequality, and rent-income ratios. 
Finally, these analyses show that Guyana is a DInRT economy underpinned by 
servicization, which produces a rentier developmental model along with its adverse 
implications. 
Figure 3 The Six Largest Industries as a % of GDP 
Data source: Bank of Guyana 
Figure 4 Final Consumption Expenditure as a % of GDP 
Data source: World Bank  
R² = 0.87902 
R² = 0.83435 
R² = 0.98484 
0% 
5% 
10% 
15% 
20% 
25% 
30% 
1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 
Sugarcane as a % of 
GDP 
Other manufacturing 
as a % of GDP 
Construction as a % of 
GDP 
Distribution as a % of 
GDP 
Transport & 
Communications as a 
% of GDP 
Government as a % of 
GDP 
Poly. (Construction as 
a % of GDP) 
Poly. (Distribution as a 
% of GDP) 
Poly. (Transport & 
Communications as a 
% of GDP) 
0	  20	  
40	  60	  
80	  100	  
120	  
1974	   1976	   1978	   1980	   1982	   1984	   1986	   1988	   1990	   1992	   1994	   1996	   1998	   2000	   2002	   2004	   2006	   2008	   2010	   2012	  
FCE	  %	  OF	  GDP	  Linear	  (FCE	  %	  OF	  GDP)	  
7 New Concepts and Metrics 
 Rentier developmentalism extends the argument that neo-liberalism leads to rentier 
capitalism to the poor and developing world. Concerns of inequality and democratic 
capture by rentiers are not confined to the financialization process in advanced countries; 
poor and developing states face similar challenges because of servicization. Introducing 
the term DInRT into the development literature strengthens the argument for industrial 
policies and innovation systems. Growth enhancing structural transformation (Rodrik 
2009) and (Chang 1993) will reduce the dominance of the DInRT economy and the 
adverse implications of servicization.  
 The concept of rentier developmentalism illustrates the limitation of the standard 
categorization of countries into high, middle and low-income groups. This classification 
determines whether a country is advanced, developing or poor, but does not reveal how 
sustainable or inclusive is a country’s growth regime. Standardizing the classification of 
FIRE and DInRT economies is essential to any reform agenda that seeks to prevent 
financial crises and reduce rent seeking and inequality. Increases in per capita income are 
not sufficient to determine whether a country is developing or not, even if standards of 
living and socio-politico freedoms increase. An appropriate definition of a developing 
country must go beyond this and include a low rent-income ratio; otherwise, a high rent-
income ratio would indicate that rising per capita income is regulated by either 
financialization or servicization. Where further probing and analysis would reveal rising 
inequality, household indebtedness and fragile growth.  
 This means that FIRE and DInRT as ratios to GDP are not perfect measures of 
rentier economies; a metric of rent-income ratio would be an invaluable supplemental 
measure. FIRE and DInRT sectors are specific forms of rent seeking and new forms may 
emerge in the future that is not well captured by this categorization.  A metric of rent-
income ratio grounded in our definition of rent (income earned without value creation or 
production activities) would be helpful in classifying countries as the forms of rent 
seeking evolve. Additionally, a rent seeking employment-total employment ratio can 
improve the accuracy of how we classify countries. A rising rent seeking employment-
total employment ratio indicates the deepening of value extraction along with all the 
adverse implications of rentier economies. In poor countries where data availability is a 
major concern, the DInRT to GDP ratio will be the best measure, but other well off 
countries can employ all three measures to gauge the scale of rent seeking. Combining 
these new metrics with standard analytical data (growth rate, unemployment rate etc.) the 
analyst is better positioned to assess the dynamics of growth and distribution in a country 
and the world economy.  
8 Conclusion 
Rentier capitalism has threatened global stability and made much of global 
growth since the late 1980s unsustainable. It accompanies increasing levels of rent 
seeking, household indebtedness and inequality. Similarly, many poor and developing 
countries have become trapped into rentier developmentalism. Although these rentier 
economies do not threaten global growth or stability, servicization prevents the maximum 
use of opportunities created by global growth and recovery.  
This article studies Guyana and argues that its developmental trajectory is built on 
a rentier model. Consistent with rentier economies, Guyana consumes in excess of 100% 
of its GDP at the same time that the inequality between wages and rents are on the 
increase. The case study reveals that the largest sectors are rent seeking industries and 
those that are projected to be major players are also value-extracting activities. What is 
worse is the fact that the value creating sectors are on a downward trajectory, indicating 
the deepening of servicization in Guyana.  
This essay calls for a further classification of countries into DInRT and FIRE 
economies to determine the sustainability and inclusive nature of their growth models. 
When rentier economies are major players in the global economic space, global stability 
and prosperity are in jeopardy. In terms of poverty and inequality reduction, knowing the 
difference between a rentier economy and a developing country becomes critical to the 
achievement of these goals.   
In the wake of the financial crisis, global leaders and academics alike are debating 
on how best to adequately re-regulate the financial sector to prevent the adverse effects of 
financialization. But not nearly enough attention is being paid to servicization and DInRT 
economies that experience increasing inequality and endure jobless and erratic growth. 
Although DInRT economies may reduce poverty, they simultaneously increase inequality, 
which weakens social cohesion. This is contrary to the spirit of the Millennium 
Development Goals of advancing the wellbeing of the poor through political, social and 
material development. Consequently, reducing rentierism and the adverse implications of 
FIRE and DInRT sectors, must be on the reform agenda for countries that intend to build 
an inclusive society.  
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